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Approach to Securing Mobile Devices 
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Abstract— Physical objects with the addition of sensors, 
actuators and a connection to the internet form devices which 
can collect, process and communicate data to each other.  Devices 
may not have been designed with connectivity in mind and 
adding it as an afterthought is problematic.  This provides a 
significant technical challenge concerning securing the devices, as 
they are all of a sudden open to a wide range of attacks whilst 
providing more opportunities for malicious users and increases 
the chances of device compromise.  The key aim of this research 
is to address limitations in current security solutions on mobile 
devices by defining a novel approach which will sustain future 
advances in mobile technology.  Using combined security 
techniques our proposed solution will work with existing security 
technology to create a more effective and successful security 
implementation that will be suitable for a wide range of mobile 
devices. 
Keywords- Lightweight security; mobile device; smartphone; 
digital forensics; malware detection; in-network; Collaborative; 
Internet of Things 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Integrating with our daily lives mobile devices are becoming 
more valuable to us than the personal computers we appear to 
be leaving behind.  The opportunities ubiquitous computing 
provides us with are endless, from healthcare to military 
applications as well as enterprise and personal home or office 
networks.  Due to this embrace of technology, ubiquitous 
computing has influenced the advanced technology now 
available, inevitably making us expect more to be possible in 
the future such as the smart cities [1], homes and the Internet 
of Things [2] we have been promised.    
Mobile devices have evolved to be extremely capable 
devices augmenting and enhancing control of our daily lives. 
Ubiquitous in nature and containing CPU, memory, input and 
output abilities and storage makes them equal with computers 
from several years ago.  These devices allow users to complete 
a number of tasks including browsing the internet, sending and 
receiving emails, installing apps, a portal to their documents 
on the cloud, storage, streaming movies, downloading music 
and a camera are amongst some of the well-known 
capabilities.  This new paradigm will gradually fuse the digital 
and physical worlds we currently dwell in and open up many 
new opportunities for our professional, personal and social 
environments, opening paradigms such as wearable computing 
and the Internet of Things [2].  
Environments are formed by these heterogeneous devices 
which can potentially have low processing power and low 
memory capabilities but still interact with each other through 
wireless networks.  When working with a heterogeneous 
infrastructure such as this security can be overlooked.  As 
smartphones run operating systems that are similar to a 
traditional desktop PC, they can also suffer from the same 
kind of weaknesses and vulnerabilities as them as well as new 
ones [3].  Android is statistically the most targeted platform by 
cyber criminals.  More than 99% of new mobile malware in 
2014 was aimed at Android devices.  There were 727,790 
installation packages, 65,118 new mobile malware programs, 
2033 mobile banking Trojans in the second quarter, this was 
lower than the first, although has been put down to the holiday 
season [4].  An environment of connected mobile devices is 
the key to  innovation in our future.  However this is now 
forcing us to consider the security and privacy concerns it is 
presenting as some of these devices can carry a great deal of 
sensitive data.    Mobile devices can see, hear and sense their 
environments which makes them a favourite target to 
malicious users because of their data centric approach and 
complex systems  making security difficult to implement. 
This puts our trust, privacy and security on the devices at risk 
[5]. 
In this work we present our contribution in the form of a 
mechanism which forms part of our novel security framework, 
consisting of three components.  Each component is designed 
to enhance existing security solutions using both existing 
techniques and new mechanisms.  An outline of the 
framework was first presented in [6], although in this paper 
we focus on one component.  The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows.  Section II presents an overview of 
mobile device security.  We expand on this in section III and 
look at existing security and research.  We introduce our 
framework in section IV followed by the implementation of a 
specific component in section V.  We will then discuss this in 
section VI, followed by a conclusion and further works in 
section VII. 
II. MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY 
Our desire for innovation, slowly fusing the digital and 
physical worlds together is unfortunately fuelling the payload 
an attacker can achieve through a compromised device.  As 
highlighted in [7] the number of attack vectors are multiplied 
on mobile devices, as they have so much more to offer for the 
attacker.  The cost of initiating an attack will be less than the 
potential revenue they will receive if it is successful.  Further 
more, users now also store passwords and account information 
on mobile devices  as well as the increased use of Near Field 
Communication (NFC) which saves a users financial 
information. 
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From this we can deduce that the introduction of mobile 
devices in general, not just smartphones alone have impacted 
on our security in ways which PCs couldn’t do.  As our 
devices become more sophisticated, the attacks which can be 
used to compromise them also grow more sophisticated.  In 
the next section we will look at the different ways in which an 
attacker can compromise a mobile device, as well as review 
some of the motivations behind attacks.    
A. Challenges of Securing Modern Networks 
Smartphones are so ubiquitous and heterogeneous they are 
becoming complex systems that are difficult for network 
managers to manage safely in the network and also difficult 
for users to manage their own privacy.  Some of the challenges 
are discussed below [8].  
• Mobile devices have an increased number of vectors in 
which they can be infected, including by Bluetooth, MMS, 
HTTP and SMS or generally through attacks in the 
application layer, communication protocols and operating 
system. 
• Mobile devices are usually always on and with the user. 
Alongside numerous sensors present on the device, this 
could potentially allow the device to continuously sense 
the context of a users environment.  
• Smaller devices means potentially less resources, CPU and 
memory.  This results in heavy security software being 
unable to run or not as efficient on the devices.  
• Constant movement between numerous unknown 
networks.  As most computing devices are now mobile, 
users can connect them to numerous networks which may 
or may not be trusted, and send sensitive data through the 
network.  
• Some users do not seem to know much about these 
advanced devices and how to use them safely and securely. 
They may apply the same password for everything or 
download apps which are not verified without checking the 
permissions the app requests. 
• Low physical protection surrounding a mobile device. 
Devices like smartphones and tablet computers can easily 
be stolen or left at different locations. 
• Contradicting goals of current security such as the 
requirement for security but without it directly affecting 
the usability of the device can limit the security applied.  
• The Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies have a 
compromise in the way they can’t control what a user uses 
their device for and what they put on their device as well 
as the security they run on it. 
III. EXISTING SECURITY 
Security on mobile devices can be looked at as either on 
the device or implemented at market level.  In the application 
market, apps may be subjected to a review in which it will be 
analysed and tested against a set list of criteria.  Application 
signing is also used in which each app published must be 
signed by the author in order to establish authorship. 
However even with these two security features in place attacks 
can still compromise the device.  On device security includes 
the use of permissions which is designed to restrict what 
actions an app can perform on the device, although in order to 
get round this attacks have been known to use multiple apps in 
order to achieve a goal.  Users also grant all the permissions 
requested by an app therefore allowing it to do what it wants.  
Google has a method of detecting malicious apps before 
they are integrated into the Google Play Store [9].  Their 
solution, Bouncer, is able to determine if apps send SMS 
messages out to malicious users, although this technique isn't 
useful to those users who take advantage of the third party app 
stores.  Samsung also have their own security system known 
as Knox in their new line of smartphones.  Their strategy 
includes secure boot, ARM TrustZone-based Integrity 
Measurement Architecture, and a kernel with built in security 
measurements.  This creates a good starting point to build 
appropriate security that is integrated into the mobile devices 
[4]. 
 In [10] the authors address mobile security challenges and 
develop Mobile Guardian, a framework for security policy 
enforcement on mobile devices.  In particular they investigate 
sensitive data isolation, security policy formulation, security 
policy testing and security policy execution.  Their framework 
is designed to be secure, flexible and scaleable whilst targeting 
enterprise networks over personal networks due to the BYOD 
policies.  It can be adopted on many platforms in order to 
implement access control, data confidentiality, security and 
integrity.    
An end-to-end security framework is introduced in [11].  It 
focuses on the specialised web transfer Constrained 
Application Protocol (CoAP) as it provides strong security 
whilst running on the smallest of nodes and networks with 
constrained resources.  In their work they bind the CoAP with 
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) to provide end-to-
end security without incurring much overhead.  This is similar 
to the research in [12] which again utilises the CoAP protocol 
but this time alongside an optimised implementation of the 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) inside a 
smart object.  In this work the authors focus on scenarios such 
as in e-health and smart buildings where vast amounts of 
sensitive data are managed and if leaked could harm the 
privacy of the users.  The authors design a distributed 
approach to control access to the sensitive information on such 
networks which involves the smart devices themselves making 
fine-grained authorisation decisions.  
Current security is not well adapted and needs to be 
enhanced by new thinking and not just small solutions filling 
gaps but by a new integrating 'framework' way of approaching 
it.  This is recognised in other works such as [13] in which the 
author identifies the need for a new secure system architecture 
or re-evaluating and enhancing the existing architecture so it 
will be suitable for deployment on new networks such as the 
IoT.  Security would benefit by being enhanced in a way that 
will allow the same framework to be applicable in numerous 
applications in different environments, both utilising existing 
techniques as well as new ones.  This is more important now 
as technology is constantly evolving at an immense rate, we 
don’t know and have no way of knowing what could be 
released within the next ten years.  Keeping up with the fast 
pace of technology and its prevailing threats is a challenge in 
itself as is trying to keep ahead of malicious threats, attacks 
and vulnerabilities.  In order to overcome these challenges we 
have identified a solution that neither replaces the full security 
or sections of it.  It adapts current security in a way that it will 
enhance it for future networks.  In this work we focus on one 
particular component of our framework, although in the next 
section we will introduce the full framework to see how this 
component fits in.   
IV. FRAMEWORK SOLUTION 
In order to address the challenges identified above, we 
have designed a novel framework which is aimed at enhancing 
general security as well as providing stable building blocks to 
develop future security.  Our framework consists of three 
components; 1) a Lightweight Forensics Application (LFA) 
that runs on the device 2) a Central Security Manager (CSM) 
that runs in the network and 3) a collaborative component that 
will run between devices in a network.  The three components 
are each designed to complete their own tasks, however the 
three of them are integrated and work with each other in order 
to create an effective framework for security.  The framework 
itself is designed to be applicable on any type of network 
including IoT, cloud, home, enterprise, public or specialised 
such as medical networks.  The concept of the framework will 
not change despite the environment it is in.  The integration of 
the three components can be seen in figure 1.  Both the LFA 
and Collaborative (Col) components collect data for the CSM. 
In this section we introduce each of the components and 
briefly what their individual tasks are.   
A. Lightweight Forensics Application (LFA)   
The LFA is designed to be lightweight to ensure it can be 
dynamic to adapt to any device it will be integrated on.  This 
includes devices with very low processing power such as 
small sensors.    It has a priority to collect data that the CSM 
can use in order to enforce security.  It does this by adhering to 
a predefined set of classifications.  This data is then sent to the 
CSM component for further analysis.  The LFA doesn't need to 
know why it is looking for specific data.  It has been inspired 
by forensics as it has a set number of actions to look for but 
does not know specifically what it is looking for.  We are 
assuming the LFA will run in a protected kernel within the 
device itself, although saving minimal data and none about the 
user makes it a low target for malicious users.  The LFA may 
respond to one CSM in work, and another at home, allowing 
the companies to specify policies and implement them.  
B. Central Security Manager (CSM) 
The CSM contains all the heavy processing and decision 
making.  The CSM collects data from the LFA and Col 
components.  Resources and processing power  will be 
required in order to utilise data being sent to it from the LFA 
and Col components.  Placing the CSM in the network 
therefore ensures it has access to what it needs, as well as 
other assets such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) or Anti-Virus.  The CSM is designed to be highly 
automated, making decisions for itself rather than waiting for 
an admin to assess the problem.     Reports will be created by  
Fig. 1. Framework Component Integration 
the CSM so security administrators can be kept in the loop of 
what is happening, and some events may require their 
attention. 
C. Collaborative Component 
The Col component collects data in the distributed network 
which can indicate possible vulnerabilities, threats and attacks 
on a larger scale.  This component also allows for different 
policies to be applied in different networks.  For example a 
user may have a personal Col network at home with family 
devices connected to one CSM.  As they arrive in work their 
device automatically switches to the business Col network to 
ensure policies are followed.  This will ensure devices are 
useable at home as normal although in work restrictions may 
take hold in order to follow the corporate policies for BYOD. 
The Col component also allows us to further ensure the LFA 
remains lightweight by including shared processing and tasks 
as well as ensuring the LFA on each device is not 
compromised and secure.    
V. LIGHTWEIGHT FORENSICS APPLICATION COMPONENT  
We have briefly introduced each of the components and 
how they integrate with each other.  We will now look into 
their design further to show how they can enhance current 
security.  
A. Lightweight Forensics Application Design 
 It could be that in the future that the LFA will facilitate the 
collection of the data for other purposes such as medical 
applications, however we are only concerned with the data 
collection in this work for the CSM.  In order to implement 
this we have decided the LFA has the following main 
mechanisms:  
App Runtime - We are going to assume that the LFA will 
run as a module in protected kernel space within the mobile 
device, therefore not accessible via application or operating 
system vulnerabilities.  The LFA quietly monitors actions on 
the device and will trigger an event when a condition of one or 
more of the classifications are met.  It doesn't store any user 
data, and will only store triggered events for a short period of 
time.  Purely a data collection component this reduces the risk 
of it becoming a target for compromise.  
Classifications - We don't want the LFA to be searching 
for everything all the time as it will use too many resources 
continuously on constrained devices.  Generally an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) uses either anomaly detection or 
misuse detection to identify malicious actions on a system.  In 
our work, we will be using neither of these as they are too 
resource intensive for most smaller mobile devices to 
maintain.  We use our own novel technique which will prove 
lightweight and more efficient to our needs.  Our mechanism 
is formed using classifications, which minimises the list of 
events the LFA is monitoring for at any one time.  This 
method also ensures low false positive events and aids the 
LFA in prioritising certain trigger events.   !
The classifications are created and provided by the security 
administrator initially.  Classifications can be used to detect 
general events or specific threats or events depending on what 
the CSM or the admin deems necessary. Different 
classifications may be used on separate devices depending on 
the risks on the device.  For a smartphone used for business 
the security administrator may choose to have classifications 
which detect data leakage, unintentional disclosure of data and 
surveillance attacks.  For a personal smartphone the user may 
choose to have classifications which can detect spyware, 
financial malware or diallerware attacks.  In a smart home 
environment the classifications could include personal security 
and surveillance.  Once the LFA detects actions relating to 
these classifications it will send reports to the CSM.  The 
CSM may make the decision then to alter the classifications to 
allow it to gain more information if it suspects anything else 
that could be happening on the device.  The CSM may also 
obtain data from external inputs such as IDS or firewalls and 
utilise the data to create new classifications for the connected 
LFA’s to follow.  
Threats which have not yet been seen before could be 
recognised as a result of this classification method although 
the LFA will not recognise it as a new threat, this will be down 
to the CSM.  Using this mechanism, we can ensure the LFA 
remains as lightweight as possible, whilst also not missing 
suspicious events.  
Trigger Events - When a suspicious event is detected on 
the device, a report will firstly be sent to the LFAs own event 
log system.  If the event has a high priority then it will be sent 
by the LFA to the CSM immediately to ensure it is analysed 
quickly.  If the event is not high priority then the LFA will 
leave it saved within its own memory until the CSM requests 
it.  To maintain security and ensure there is no compromise the 
CSM will randomly request an event report from the LFA. 
This will be approximately every 24 hours.  Each event will be 
uniquely numbered and encrypted with a one time cypher so 
the CSM can check against previous reports that it hasn't 
missed any requested reports and it can also determine if a 
report has been compromised and tampered with.  Sorting the 
reports in terms of priority also ensures the CSM is using its 
resources more effectively.  Once the CSM receives a valid 
event report it will send a receipt to the LFA which will then 
delete all the event reports it has previously sent.  This will 
ensure the LFA does not start using too much storage space 
within the device and reduces the amount of data that could be 
extracted if the device was compromised.  
B. Experimentation and Results 
In this remainder of this work we will discuss the 
experimental implementation we have undertaken and the 
results we have achieved so far.  Due to its timeliness we have 
decided to use the Internet of Things as a platform on which to 
trial the LFA.  As the smartphone is a very common device 
within the IoT we will utilise it for our experiments.  Although 
the theory of the LFA and ultimately the framework itself will 
allow it to be implemented in various environments.  
In order to experiment with the classification mechanism 
we produced, we have used the Android Eclipse device 
emulator.  One of the test classifications we developed was 
targeting SPAM messages to a smartphone.  If the LFA 
follows the classification and detects the words “download”, 
“install” and “http://“ it automatically notifies the user of the 
detected possible SPAM message.  We experimented with the 
classification method for a number of different types of 
example SPAM and social engineering messages and these 
were picked up by our classification method as expected 
whilst ignoring all normal social messages sent.  This ensures 
our classification method is suitable for this framework. 
Some classifications such as the SMS monitor may run 
continuously on the device, whereas other classifications may 
only run intermittently.  In particular we have used the alarm 
feature in Android eclipse which runs a background service at 
regular intervals relying on an alarm to initiate it.  This 
ensures the resources used are as low as possible.  In an 
experiment we have created it checks the battery level every 
two hours, and if it has dramatically increased compared to the 
last time it has checked it will check the time of day it is.  If it 
is night time and the phone is in idle mode, a trigger event will 
be created. 
Figure 4 shows the memory usage of the SMS monitor. 
The Android Eclipse DDMS information console provided the 
data.  The majority of the memory shown is free memory.  The 
section with the arrow pointing to it and the relevant label is 
the SMS monitor and is significantly low.  In order to 
experiment with this further we added on more classifications 
for the LFA to be looking for.  In particular it monitored for 
incoming and outgoing calls, the  
Fig. 4. Memory usage of SMS monitor 
Fig. 5. Memory Usage of the modified SMS monitor. 
Fig. 6. CPU usage of the modified SMS monitor. 
state of the microphone and camera and also implemented the 
battery classification discussed earlier. 
Whilst the modified SMS monitor application was running 
on a physical device we again monitored memory it was 
using.  The results can be seen in Figure 5.  We are encouraged 
by the reduced memory it is using at it is only searching for 
minimal events due to the classification mechanism, even 
though it is monitoring for a number of items.  We are also 
confident we can reduce this more, as it is still currently 
running on the screen of the device all the time.  The CPU 
usage for this app can be seen in Figure 6, throughout running 
the app and purposely triggering a number of the events the 
CPU % stays below 10%.  As discussed earlier some of the 
classifications may continue to run all the time, whilst others 
may only run at specified points during the day or night.  This 
will ultimately help to keep the resources used to a minimum.  
In order to communicate this event report with the CSM 
we needed an output method.  We initially instructed the LFA 
to save the number and text which triggered the classification 
to a .txt or .csv file internally on the device.  This represents 
the report and log created by the LFA that would be sent to the 
CSM.  We have implemented this on the virtual device 
emulated by Eclipse.  We have also implemented it on 
physical Android devices although we had to integrate a way 
to save it to an external SDCard.  This is due to being unable 
to access files on the device directly, which proves a problem 
for the testing point of view but in a final LFA implementation 
would not remain an issue.  
The trigger event report is an important feature as it must  
Fig. 7. The output file received from SMS monitor. 
!
Fig. 8. Saving Data in an SQLite 
contain all the information the CSM requires in order to make 
it useful, whilst also ensuring it doesn't over complicate 
matters for the LFA causing it to use more resources and 
processing power trying to send it.   
We have experimented using an output as .txt and .csv 
files, as these can then be imported into a database.  The CSM 
will be able to use this feature to create a log of all the events, 
separate them into relevant classifications and look at them all 
as an overview to discover patterns in trigger event behaviour 
across the device.  The CSM will then create a full report 
which can be reviewed by relevant specialists who can 
identify the malicious actions taking place on the device.  The 
CSM may also decide to request a sample, for example coding 
of an app, the permissions it uses, what data it gathers so it can 
integrate this into the report and send it to specialised scanning 
software to identify known malicious software.  
Figure 7 shows the output file we have received from 
classification 3.  At the moment it only shows the output to 
include the phone number it was received from and also the 
event that triggered the LFA to react to it.  Realistically this 
would include more data regarding the classification without 
using any personal user data.  In further experiments we 
decided on using SQLite files to save the events detected on 
the device.  This can be seen in figure 8 using the battery 
classification.  This decision was made as it allows us to then 
add further data in as required in the same file and makes it 
easier for the CSM to read.  The LFA can easily delete the 
records after they have been sent to the CSM to ensure they 
don't take up too much memory. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have explored alternatives to current 
security by complementing and extending existing security in 
the form of a novel framework.  A combination of which we 
believe will be a significant step to enhance the security of our 
devices from malicious actions in future networking.  This 
work has focused on one particular component within our 
framework, the LFA.  This work has successfully set out to 
prove that the theory of the LFA is feasible within a series of 
experiments and components and will complement existing 
security.  Our results in this work are very encouraging and the 
LFA can be adapted onto numerous devices with small or large 
computing abilities.   
Current and future networks are moving towards heavy 
processing and data storage on the network, and smaller 
devices on the edge of the network.  These devices can include 
a range of types such as smartphones, desktop computers, 
laptops, smart watches, smart fridges, smart TVs and even 
smart houses and may be restricted in terms of the resources 
they have.  Our framework is a perfect candidate to be run on 
this type of network due to its flexibility.  It will run on a 
number of different networks, such as Cloud, IoT, home, 
enterprise and many more.  In a likewise the manner the LFA 
is suitable to be implemented on a vast range of devices from 
more traditional smartphones, desktop computers, laptops, 
smart wearable technology and smaller sensors such as 
environmental sensors.  The LFA is dynamic so can be more 
prevalent on devices which have increased resources and less 
involved on other devices.  This ensures it remains lightweight 
as to not interfere with the usage of the device.  The 
classification mechanism it uses ensure it remains lightweight 
whilst not missing key events.  Unlike other work it doesn't 
look for anything specific unless it is directed to, therefore 
will have the ability to detect new threats and attacks even 
though it won’t recognise this itself.  No user data is passed to 
the CSM or stored on the LFA, so the LFA could not be 
manipulated to provide sensitive data.  The LFA takes the 
security aspect away from the user, as noted in numerous 
works the unaware user is the weakest part of the security 
implementations.  Using the framework and the LFA’s style of 
detecting threats, attacks and vulnerabilities the user will not 
be required to make decisions as this is in the control of the 
network security administrator.  This could be the security 
administrator in a business or security administrator for 
personal devices and networks such as smart homes.  Proving 
dynamic the framework can be implemented in different ways 
to suit the network but ultimately each component will still be 
present for the same reason using the same initial theory and 
communicating with existing security such as firewalls and 
IDS.     
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Our experiments demonstrated in this paper establish the 
feasibility of our approach to address the challenges on mobile 
devices in terms of security.  We show that the LFA 
component itself is novel as it forms a vital part of our 
framework, it doesn't communicate sensitive user data or save 
it internally, it doesn't monitor for anything too specific to 
ensure it can pick up a vast number of threats, attacks and 
vulnerabilities, it is dynamic depending on the host device and 
doesn't need the user to instruct it and finally it is lightweight. 
This gives it an advantage over other works to detect various 
threats, attacks and vulnerabilities efficiently without affecting 
the devices normal actions.  
Overall the results make a contribution to rethinking 
mobile device security in preparation for Ubiquitous 
Computing and the Internet of Things, by distributing load 
from low resource areas (mobile devices) to high resource 
areas (the network). 
Now we have proven the feasibility of the LFA component 
we are currently continuing work on the following aspects: 
- Testing against live attacks.  This is ongoing using 
smartphones, Android in particular.  It will allow us to 
determine a vast number of threats, attacks and 
vulnerabilities this LFA will be able to detect and pass the 
data on to the CSM within the framework to be analysed.  
- Device Diversity.  Some mobile devices may have more 
processing than others.  A smartphone will have more 
resources than a simple sensor for example.  We are 
developing the LFA further so it can be integrated onto any 
device by adapting the classifications.  
- LFA security.  We are assuming the LFA will run in 
protected kernel space, but it would still become a target to 
attackers if it is associated with security so lightweight 
security of its own will be investigated. 
- We are utilising a collaborative network between trusted 
devices to allow them to share resources and detection 
classifications.  This will further enhance the lightweight 
capabilities of the LFA, and will be beneficial to devices 
which need resources for other tasks.  !
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